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Redrawing the Lines: Power Politics and Communities at Risk 
By Amanda Munsie 
 
INTRODUCTION 
After each decennial census, the map of every state’s congressional election district must 
be redrawn to accommodate population shifts not only within the state, but also throughout the 
country.
1
 Congressional redistricting is the method of redrawing the boundary lines of every 
state’s congressional district.2 Each state undertakes the process every ten years. While it is 
always difficult to adjust for population shifts and accommodate conflicting political end goals, 
in 2011, the New Jersey Redistricting Commission (“Commission”) was tasked with an 
additional challenge: eliminating one seat.
3
 While the Census Bureau reported New Jersey’s 
population grew 4.5% from 2000 to 2010, with states like Nevada and Texas growing both 
                                                 
1
 Frederick Kaimann, N.J. Loses seat in Congress as Census Bureau unveils population numbers, THE STAR 
LEDGER (Dec. 21, 2011), available at 
http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2010/12/nj_to_lose_seat_in_congress_af.html 
2
ABOUT REDISTRICTING, Congressional Redistricting, NEW JERSEY REDISTRICTING 
http://www.njredistrictingcommission.org/aboutredistricting.asp (last visited Mar. 4, 2012).  
3
 Frederick Kaimann, N.J. Loses seat in Congress as Census Bureau unveils population numbers, THE STAR 
LEDGER (Dec. 21, 2011), available at 
http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2010/12/nj_to_lose_seat_in_congress_af.html 
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35.1% and 20.6% in population, respectively, New Jersey’s representation in the House needed 
to be reduced to account for the growing population of other states.
4
  
John Farmer, Jr., dean of Rutgers School of Law in Newark, New Jersey, and former 
New Jersey Attorney General, headed the 2011 Commission.
5
 Since it’s origin, the Commission 
has been comprised of thirteen members: six from each of the two major political parties and one 
independent tiebreaker.
6
 Mr. Farmer, as the head of the commission, serves as the tiebreaker.
7
 
While the members from the two major political parties, Republican and Democrat, each 
presented dueling maps, ultimately only one could be chosen. In effect, because it is presumed 
that members of the Commission will vote along party lines, Mr. Farmer selected the winning 
map. A variety of factors are used when evaluating the maps: equal representation; complying 
with the mandate of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which requires districts to not be racially 
discriminatory; compact districts containing communities of interest, adjacent towns and 
preserved municipalities; and protection of incumbents.
8
 The protection of incumbent 
congressional representatives is one of the most controversial factors Congress considers in the 
redistricting process.
9
 
                                                 
4
Kaimann, supra note 1. In addition to New Jersey, nine other states lost a House seat: New York, Pennsylvania, 
Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Missouri, Michigan and Ohio. Id.  
5
 Matt Friedman, Rutgers Law School Dean Named Tiebreaker of Commission to Redraw Congressional Districts, 
NJ.COM (July 16, 2011), http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2011/07/rutgers_law_school_dean_select.html.  
6
 The twelve members of the Commission are Assemblyman Joseph Roberts, Jr, who serves as the Democrat 
Delegation Chair; Michael J. Baker, who serves as Delegation Vice Chair; Michael DuHaime, who serves as 
Republican Delegation Chair; Assemblywoman Caroline Casagrande; Nilsa Cruz-Perez; Sherine El-Abd; Edward 
Farmer; Aubrey Fenton; Jeannine Frisby LaRue; Eric Jaso; M. Susan Sheppard; and Philip Thigpen. See NEW 
JERSEY REDISTRICTING, http://www.njredistrictingcommission.org/aboutredistricting.asp (last visited Mar. 4, 
2012).  
7
 ABOUT REDISTRICTING, Congressional Redistricting Timeframe in New Jersey, NEW JERSEY REDISTRICTING, 
http://www.njredistrictingcommission.org/aboutredistricting.asp (last visited Mar. 4, 2012).  
8
 ABOUT REDISTRICTING, Redistricting Principles, NEW JERSEY REDISTRICTING, 
http://www.njredistrictingcommission.org/aboutredistricting.asp (last visited Mar. 4, 2012). 
9
 Donal Scarcini & Nomi Lowy, Congressional Redistricting in New Jersey, 32 SETON HALL L. REV. 821 (2002); 
see also, infra, Incumbent Protection discussed in Part III 
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On its face, the redistricting process consists of three phases: the Census, where, among 
other data are compiled, everyone in the United States is counted; congressional apportionment, 
where Congress determines the number of representatives to which each state is entitled;
10
 and 
finally, the literal redrawing of the boundary lines into the number apportioned by Congress, 
which is the responsibility of each states’ government and done differently nationwide.11 One of 
the constitutional goals of redistricting is to achieve the principle of “one person, one vote.”12  In 
explaining this principle, former United States Supreme Court Chief Justice Earl Warren, in his 
majority opinion in Reynolds v. Sims, stated, “Legislators represent people, not trees or acres. 
Legislators are elected by voters, not farms or cities or economic interests.” 13  By drawing 
districts based on population, and not area, each person in a state is as equally represented in the 
United States House of Representatives as possible.
14
 
This Note explores the Congressional redistricting process nationwide and specifically 
evaluates the process in New Jersey. While the commission in New Jersey is bipartisan, 
ultimately, only one party can win. The term bipartisan actually means “two parties,” however, it 
suggests a joint effort of both the Republicans and Democrats working together to come up with 
the best option for the parties collectively – a compromise. Here, however, party politics are still 
at the center of the redistricting battle. Both the Democratic and Republican members of the 
commission come with political history in New Jersey and thus, a political agenda. The 
members, having collectively been privy to the political scene in both New Jersey and 
                                                 
10
 ABOUT REDISTRICTING, The Census, Congressional Apportionment, and the United States Constitution, NEW 
JERSEY REDISTRICTING, http://www.njredistrictingcommission.org/aboutredistricting.asp (last visited Mar. 4, 
2012); ECON. & STAT. ADMIN, U.S. DEPT. OF COMM., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Strength in Numbers: Your Guide 
to Census 2010 Redistricting Data From the U.S. Census Bureau (hereinafter “Strength in Numbers”), at 1 (July 
2010). 
11
 Strength in Numbers, supra note 11, at 1.  
12
 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 558 (1964).  
13
 Id. 
14
 The Census, Congressional Apportionment, and the United States Constitution, supra note 11.  
 4 
Washington, D.C., could be seen as protecting their own. The fact that each party presents 
dueling maps in an attempt to capitalize on the population shift,
 15
 shows a bias for members of 
their own political party, rather than a focus on other important redistricting values, like keeping 
communities of interest together.
16
 In fact, it has been argued by Micah Altman, the Director of 
Research and Head Scientist for the Program on Information Science for the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology Libraries, among others, that there is actually no such thing as purely 
neutral redistricting, as one side always stands to gain from the way the map is drawn.
17
 While 
the New Jersey system acts as an independent commission, theoretically free from any political 
pressure from the legislature, this Note will show how in practice, by creating a commission of 
members of the political elite, partisan politics is still at the forefront of the redistricting arena.  
Part I of this Note discusses the redistricting process in New Jersey and the constitutional 
constraints that are put on redrawing the maps nationwide. Part II of this Note describes the 2011 
Redistricting Process in New Jersey and examines the members selection for the 2011 
Commission. Part III of this Note explores the interests at play during the New Jersey 2011 
Redistricting Process. It compares the dueling interests of “sweetheart districts” 18  and 
incumbency protection with keeping municipalities and communities of interest together. It 
elaborates on how incumbency protection was at the forefront of the 2011 redistricting process 
and considers other factors that would benefit New Jersey residents in a better, more important 
way. Part IV of this Note compares the New Jersey system with those of other states that employ 
an arguably less partisan, and potentially fairer, system for undertaking the redistricting process. 
                                                 
15
 Editorial, N.J. Gov. Christie’s Intervention in Redistricting Process Went Too Far, TRENTON TIMES, Apr. 6, 
2011, available at, http://www.nj.com/times-opinion/index.ssf/2011/04/editorial_nj_gov_christies_int.html (last 
visited Mar. 12, 2012).  
16
 See, infra, Part III and IV.  
17
 Micah Altman, The Computational Complexity of Automated Redistricting: Is Automation the Answer? 23 
RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 81, 86 (1997).  See also BRUCE E. CAIN, THE REAPPORTIONMENT PUZZLE 77 
(1984) 
18
 See, infra Incumbent protection, Part III.  
 5 
It examines techniques other states utilize in attempting to take politics out of redistricting, and 
questions if redistricting can ever be truly politically neutral. While each state’s system has its 
strengths, the redistricting process is flawed nationwide. In order to create a fairer process for 
New Jersey redistricting, the interest of protecting incumbents needs to be given less weight and 
focus needs to be put on the constituents and their communities.  
I. BACKGROUND 
The process of congressional redistricting has largely been left to the states. The Federal 
Government’s role is limited to conducting the Census, reapportioning the number of seats each 
state is entitled to, and if questioned, reviewing the constitutionality of the final maps presented 
by the states.
19
 Otherwise, states are generally unrestricted in deciding the means by which they 
redraw the boundaries of their congressional districts. After the United States Supreme Court 
declared the 1990 map, drawn by the New Jersey Legislature, unconstitutional,
20
 New Jersey has 
taken the redistricting process out of the hands of the state Legislature and place it into those of 
an independent bipartisan commission.  
A. HISTORY OF THE CENSUS AND SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT OF 
CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING 
 
The first step in the redistricting process is the United States Census. Under the United 
States Constitution, the fundamental purpose of the Census is to ensure that the representation of 
each state in the United States House of Representatives reflects its relative population.
21
 Since 
                                                 
19
 See Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 
20
 Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 727 (1982). 
21
 According to U.S. Const. art. 1, 2, cl. 3: 
Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several states which may be 
included within this union, according to their respective numbers, which shall be determined by 
adding to the whole number of free persons, including those bound to services for a term of years, 
and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons.   
See also, U.S. Const. amend. XIV, 2, “Representatives shall be apportioned among the several states according to 
their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each state, excluding Indians not taxed.”  
 6 
the first Census in 1790, the population of the United States is counted every ten years.
22
 The 
Census numbers ensure that our representative districts reflect the respective population numbers 
and possess equal weight and equal representation for the United States House of 
Representatives, state legislatures, and city and town governments.
23
 The Census is conducted by 
mailing questionnaires to all United States households. In order to get the most accurate 
calculation possible, Census takers will visit the homes of those who did not respond to the 
questionnaire.
24
  
The 435 seats in the United States House of Representatives are apportioned among the 
fifty states after each decennial census.
25
 While the Census is constitutionally required, the 
Constitution does not specify how Members of the House are to be elected once they are 
apportioned to the state.
26
 Thus, with redistricting left to the states, there are various ways the 
process is undertaken. After the population is counted, pursuant to 13 U.S.C. §§ 141(a)-(b), the 
Department of Commerce and the Census Bureau provide population counts to the President and 
the states.
27
 For the 2010 Census, the official counts were required to be delivered to the 
                                                 
22
 Strength in Numbers, supra note 11, at 1.  
23
 Id. 
24
 Census 2010: What It Is and How it Works, THE LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE, 
http://www.civilrights.org/census/how-it-works.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2012).  
25
 Apportionment Data, United States Census 2010, http://2010.census.gov/2010census/data/apportionment-data.php 
(last visited Mar. 13, 2011). The apportionment population consists of the resident population of the 50 states, plus 
the overseas military and federal civilian employees and their dependents living with them who could be allocated to 
a state. The populations of the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico are excluded from the apportionment 
population because they do not have voting seats in the U.S. House of Representatives. Id.  
26
 L. Page Whitaker, Congressional Redistricting: The Constitutionality of Creating an At-Large District, CRS 
REPORT FOR CONGRESS, March 20, 2007.  
27
 Strength in Numbers, supra note 11, at 2; 13 U.S.C. § 141(a): 
The Secretary shall, in the year 1980 and every 10 years thereafter, take a decennial census of 
population as of the first day of April of such year, which date shall be known as the “decennial 
census date,” in such form and content as he may determine, including the use of sampling 
procedures and special surveys. In connection with any such census, the Secretary is authorized 
to obtain such other census information as necessary. 
13 U.S.C. § 141(b), “The tabulation of total population by States under subsection (a) of this section as required for 
the apportionment of Representatives in Congress among the several States shall be completed within 9 months after 
the census date and reported by the Secretary to the President of the United States.” 
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President on or before December 31, 2010.
28
 In early January 2011, the President reported the 
figures to Congress, which included the population of each state and the number of 
representatives apportioned thereto.
29
 Within fifteen days of this report, the Clerk of the House of 
Representatives is required to send each state’s government a certificate stating how many 
representatives the state is allotted in the next Congress.
30
 
 Standards for redistricting were first established in 1842, which stated that 
Representatives “should be elected by districts composed of contiguous territory equal in number 
to the number of Representatives to which each said state shall be entitled, no one district 
electing more than one Representative.”31 The Apportionment Act of 1872 added to the statute, 
requiring that districts should contain “as nearly as practicable an equal number of inhabitants.”32 
The Apportionment Act of 1901 added the requirement of a compact territory, meaning that 
districts must be made up of “contiguous and compact territory and containing as nearly as 
practicable an equal number of inhabitants.”33  
Not only is redistricting governed by statute, there are various United States Supreme 
Court cases which interpret these statutes and govern the process of redistricting as well. In 
1963, the Supreme Court case of Baker v. Carr first established that the process of 
apportionment was no longer a political question and was now justiciable by the federal courts.
34
 
The Court enumerated six factors to determine whether an issue was a non-justiciable political 
                                                 
28
 13 U.S.C. § 141(b) 
29
 Strength in Numbers, supra note 11, at 3.  
30
 Id.; New Jersey Governor Chris Christine received the 2010 Population Totals on February 3, 2011, Press 
Release, U.S. Census Bureau Delivers New Jersey's 2010 Census Population Totals, Including First Look at Race 
and Hispanic Origin Data for Legislative Redistricting, Feb. 3, 2011, 
http://2010.census.gov/news/releases/operations/cb11-cn15.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2012).  
31
 5 Stat. § 491 (1842) 
32
 17 Stat. § 492 (1842) 
33
 26 Stat. § 736 (1842) 
34
 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).  
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question.
35
 While the case is often cited for its analysis of justiciability, the landmark decision of 
Baker established the court’s role in the apportionment and redistricting process. The following 
year, the Court weighed in for the first time on challenges to the apportionment and redistricting 
process. The Court began setting the judicial framework for these challenges in the 1964 cases of 
Wesberry v. Sanders and Reynolds v. Sims.
36
 Through these cases, the Court articulated the 
maxim “one person, one vote.”37 In Wesberry v. Sanders, the Court held that the Constitution 
requires members of the House of Representatives to be selected by districts composed, as nearly 
as possible, of equal population, stating “[a]s nearly as is practicable one person’s vote in a 
congressional election is to be worth as much as another’s.”38 In Reynolds v. Sims,39 the court 
also reaffirmed the principle that state legislative districts must be “as nearly of equal population 
as is practicable.”40 Later, in the 1969 case Wells v. Rockefeller, the Court held that limited 
population variances among congressional districts are constitutionally permissible “only if they 
are unavoidable despite a good-faith effort to achieve absolute equality or if justification for 
them is shown.”41 
In 1993, in Shaw v. Reno, white voters in North Carolina alleged that the district 
boundaries created an unconstitutional gerrymander of a district that was 160 miles long, and at 
some points no wider than the right of way on a highway, winding throughout the state 
                                                 
35
 Baker, 369 U.S at 217. The factors include:  
[A] textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political 
department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the 
impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial 
discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing 
lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning 
adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious 
pronouncements by various departments on one question. 
36
 Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).  
37
 Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 558.  
38
 Wesberry, 376 U.S.  at 1.  
39
 Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 533. 
40
 Id.  
41
 Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542 (1969).  
 9 
connecting black voters.
42
 While recognizing the idea that an ordinary shape is not 
constitutionally required, the Court found that the bizarre shape of the district served no other 
purpose than to increase the power of racial minorities, and held that race based districting, even 
if employed for remedial purposes, is subject to strict scrutiny.
43
 Shortly thereafter, in Miller v. 
Johnson, the Court addressed racial gerrymandering and found the Georgia congressional 
redistricting plan unconstitutional, reasoning that it violated the equal protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment because the plan was based predominately on race and was not shown to 
serve a compelling governmental interest.
44
 The Court held racial gerrymandering of the 
congressional redistricting process a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, stating that in 
some instances, a reapportionment plan may be so highly irregular and bizarre in shape that it 
rationally cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to segregate voters based on 
race.
45
 Finally, in 2004, in Vieth v. Jubelirer, the Court held that gerrymandering claims under 
Article I, §§2 and 4, and the Equal Protection Clause were nonjusticiable, as no judicially 
discernible and manageable standards for adjudicating such claims existed.
46
 In a plurality 
opinion, the Court stated that the remedy for gerrymandering was already within the 
Constitution: the Constitution vests state legislatures with the initial power to draw federal 
election districts, but authorizes Congress to “make or alter” those districts.47 Instead of taking 
this opportunity to resolve the important problem of how courts should handle partisan 
                                                 
42
 Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 633-34 (1993). See also, RICHARD K. SCHER ET AL., VOTING RIGHTS & 
DEMOCRACY: THE LAW AND POLITICS OF DISTRICTING 93 (1997). Gerrymandering is the practice of drawing a 
district with boundaries that attempts to establish a political advantage for a particular party or group. Redistricting 
Glossary, THE CENTER FOR VOTING AND DEMOCRACY, http://www.fairvote.org/redistricting-
glossary/#.T1KSzCPxpF8 (last visited Feb 28, 2012). Racial gerrymandering is the process of drawing the district 
boundaries to favor one particular racial group over another. Id.  
43
 Shaw, 509 U.S. at 657.   
44
 Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 917-18 (1995).  
45
 Id. The Court applied the rule laid down in Shaw v. Reno, which requires strict scrutiny whenever race is the 
“overriding, predominate force” in the redistricting process. See Shaw 509 U.S. at 630.   
46
 Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 284-85 (2004).  
47
 Id.  
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gerrymandering claims,
48
 the Court effectively has sanctioned the use of redistricting as a means 
to create political payback to disenfranchise a group of constituents, so long as that group is not a 
racial minority. 
 B. CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING LEGISLATION 
In 1941 Congress adopted 2 U.S.C. § 2a, which requires states to use the method of equal 
proportion to complete the apportionment process.
49
 Equal proportion requires the Census 
Bureau to compile a priority list of states, which is determined by dividing a state’s population 
by the geometric mean of its current and next House seats.
50
 For example, following the 2010 
Census, each of the fifty states was initially awarded one seat out of the 435 seats. The fifty-first 
seat then went to the state that had the highest priority value for its second seat. In 2010, seat 
fifty one went to California, whose priority value was 26,404,774.
51
 The next seat, number fifty 
two, went to Texas, with a second-seat priority value of 17,867,470.
52
 New Jersey received the 
sixty-ninth seat, with a second-seat priority value of 6,227,844.
53
 
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 was enacted to ensure that congressional redistricting 
does not discriminate on the basis of race, color or on being a member of a protected minority.
54
 
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act is a general prohibition against discriminatory voting 
                                                 
48
 Note, Uncertainty Maintained: The Split Decision Over Partisan Gerrymanders in Veith v. Jubelirer, Michael 
Weaver, 36 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 1273 (Summer 2005).  
49
 2 U.S.C. §2(a): 
On the first day, or within one week thereafter, of the first regular session of the Eighty-second 
Congress and of each fifth Congress thereafter, the President shall transmit to the Congress a statement 
showing the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed, as ascertained under 
the seventeenth and each subsequent decennial census of the population, and the number of 
Representatives to which each State would be entitled under an apportionment of the then existing 
number of Representatives by the method known as the method of equal proportions, no State to 
receive less than one member. 
50
 Strength in Numbers, supra note 11, at 3.  
51
 Id. 
52
 Id. 
53
 U.S. Dept. of Comm., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Priority Values for 2010 Census.  
54
 Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973; see also, Redistricting Information, THE UNITED STATES DEPT. OF 
JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/redistricting.php (last visited Mar. 9, 2012). 
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practices and procedures, including redistricting, on the basis of being a member of a protected 
minority group.
55
 The voting protections of the Fifteenth Amendment and Section 2 of the 
Voting Rights Act are permanent, however, Section 5 remains in effect only through 2031.
56
 
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act requires certain states, mostly in the South, to seek federal 
permission before changing their voting procedures, including redistricting.
57
 Any changes to 
voting process or requirements are not allowed “unless that jurisdiction can show that the change 
has neither a discriminatory purpose nor will have a discriminatory effect.”58 New Jersey is not 
required to go through the preclearance mandated by Section 5.
59
 While on its face, Section 5 
could appear to promote, or even require, racial gerrymandering as a way of giving minority 
voters a voice and a chance of electing a representative for their community in the House of 
Representatives, the Supreme Court has twice ruled, once in a plurality opinion, that a plan to 
create minority-majority districts by using the racial gerrymander was unconstitutional 
60
 and 
that Section 5 does not require racial gerrymandering.
61
 Most recently, in dealing with the  
narrow issue of Texas redistricting, the Court made reference to the “serious constitutional 
questions” raised by the Act’s preclearance requirements and its coverage formula, alluding to a 
possible constitutional challenge to Section 5 before it expires in 2031.
62
  
                                                 
55
 42 U.S.C. §1973.  
56
 Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, THE UNITED STATES DEPT. OF JUSTICE, 
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/sec_5/about.php (last visited Apr. 14, 2012).  
57
 Id.  
58
 Redistricting Information, supra  note 55.  
59
Section 5 Covered Jurisdictions, THE UNITED STATES DEPT. OF JUSTICE, 
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/sec_5/covered.php (last visited Apr. 12, 2012). Preclearance is required in the 
states which had voter turnout lower than fifty percent of the voting population in 1960 and/or 1964 or if the state or 
political subdivision of the state restricted the opportunity to vote or register to vote. See Section 5 of the Voting 
Rights Act, supra note 57.  
60
 Miller, 515 U.S. at 900. 
61
 Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 962(1996).  
62
 Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 129 S.Ct. 2504, 2513 (2009).  
 12 
 In December 1975, Congress also passed Public Law 94-171, codified as 13 U.S.C. § 
141.
63
 The law requires the Census Bureau to make special preparations to provide redistricting 
data to the fifty states no later than one year following the census under 13 U.S.C. § 141(c).
64
 
The information provided to the states includes “population counts for counties, cities, census 
blocks, and State-specific congressional districts, legislative districts, and voting districts that 
meet Census Bureau technical criteria.” 65  The 2010 Census Redistricting Data Program 
(“Program”), consists of five phases for the state governments to abide by, the first two are 
voluntary.
66
 During Phase 1, the State Legislative District Project Phase, which took place in 
2005 and 2006, states that chose to participate received guidelines for providing State legislative 
districts, while the Census Bureau collected state legislative district boundaries to tabulate 
legislative districts.
67
 States that chose to participate in Phase 2, the Voting District/Block 
Boundary Suggestion Project, which took place from 2008 to 2010, received electronic tools, 
such as flow basis and geographic products, to electronically collect voting district boundaries.
68
 
A verification phase is also offered.
69
 Delivery of the Decennial Census 2010 Redistricting Data 
constitutes Phase 3. By April 1, 2011, exactly one year after Census Day, the Census Bureau 
delivered the population counts to the Governors of each state and the majority and minority 
leaders in the state legislatures.
70
 The data included population counts for state and congressional 
districts, American Indian areas, counties, cities, and towns.
71
 After the Census Bureau provided 
the data, the states began their redistricting. The process varies by state, but is typically 
                                                 
63
 13 U.S.C. § 141.  
64
 Strength in Numbers, supra note 11, at 3.  
65
  Establishment of the 2010 Census Redistricting Program, 69 Fed. Reg. 93, 26547 (May 13, 2004).  
66
 Id. 
67
Id.; Strength in Numbers, supra note 11, at 4.  
68
 Establishment of the 2010 Census Redistricting Program, supra note 68; see also Strength in Numbers, supra note 
11, at 4.  
69
 Id.  
70
 Establishment of the 2010 Census Redistricting Program, supra note 68, at 26548.  
71
 Id.  
 13 
conducted by one or more of the following: the legislatures, the secretaries of state, governors, 
and/or redistricting commissions.
72
 During Phase 4, which takes place from 2011 to 2013, the 
Census Bureau collects the newly drawn legislative and Congressional districts from each state. 
It then prepares the new data for the 113th Congress.
73
 The final phase of the 2010 Census 
Redistricting Data Program, Phase 5, will be a review and evaluation of the Census, which will 
provide guidance and recommendations for the 2020 Census.
74
 
 Standing alone, the data presented by P.L. 94-171 means very little. Using an automated 
geographic database, the Census Bureau takes the raw data and inputs it into maps and 
geographic areas.
75
 The system, called Tiger® system, puts the data into easy to use maps, 
differentiating between, state legislative districts
76
, county block maps
77
, voting districts
78
, 
census tracts
79
, census tabulations blocks
80
 and block groups
81
. This is the data that is handed 
over to Congress, and subsequently used by the states when formulating both the congressional 
and legislative district maps.  
II. REDISTRICTING IN NEW JERSEY  
                                                 
72
 Strength in Numbers, supra note 11 at 4.  
73
 Establishment of the 2010 Census Redistricting Program, supra note 68, at 26547-48; see also Strength in 
Numbers, supra note 11, at 4.   
74
 Establishment of the 2010 Census Redistricting Program, supra note 68, at 26547-48; see also Strength in 
Numbers, supra note 11, at 4.   
75
 Strength in Numbers, supra note 11, at 4.  
76
 State legislative districts are used to elect a member to the upper or lower chambers of state legislatures. Strength 
in Numbers, supra note 11, at 6.  
77
 County blocks are the smallest tabulation areas used in the redistricting process. They encompass voting districts, 
census tracts and census tabulation blocks. Strength in Numbers, supra note 11, at 6-7; see infra note 74, note 75 and 
note 78. 
78
 Voting districts include areas such as election districts, wards, or precincts identified by the states. Strength in 
Numbers, supra note 11, at 7.  
79
 Census tracts are statistical areas averaging about 4,000 people, subdivided from counties and equivalent areas. 
The areas generally remain constant over each census. Strength in Numbers, supra note 11, at 7. 
80
 Averaging about 100 people each, census tabulation blocks are the smallest of census geographic areas, normally 
bordered by natural boundaries, like streets or other prominent physical features.  Strength in Numbers, supra note 
11, at 7. 
81
 Block groups is a set of census blocks. Strength in Numbers, supra note 11, at 7. 
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 On February 3, 2011, New Jersey Governor Chris Christie received the 2010 Census 
Population Totals.
82
 New Jersey’s population totaled 8,791,894, which constitutes a 4.5% 
population growth from 2000 to 2010.
83
 As directed by the New Jersey Constitution, the first 
step in New Jersey’s redistricting process is to appoint a bipartisan redistricting Commission.84 
Historically, congressional redistricting was left up to the state Legislature.
85
 Before the 1960 
census, when New Jersey was apportioned an additional seat, the district remained largely 
untouched for thirty years, despite differing population counts. 
86
 However, when the United 
States Supreme Court declared the 1980 map unconstitutional, due in large part to partisan 
gerrymandering, the New Jersey state government needed to take action.
87
 The power of 
redrawing the lines to comply with the 1990 Census numbers was taken out of the hands of the 
Legislature and vested in a temporary commission.
88
  
The United States Supreme Court, in Karcher v. Daggett, held that the 1980 New Jersey 
congressional map was not a good faith effort to ensure population equality among the districts 
and determined that there were two basic questions regarding population deviations in state 
legislation: (1) whether the redistricting committee could reduce the population differences 
between districts by a good faith effort, and (2) whether the differences between the districts 
were necessary due to some state interest or legislative goal.
89
 The first question is a threshold 
question and the party challenging the boundary lines bears the burden of proof of whether or not 
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 New Jersey Governor Chris Christine received the 2010 Population Totals on February 3, 2011, supra note 37.  
83
 New Jersey, State & County Quick Facts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/34000.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2012).  
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 Dr. Ernest C. Reock, Redistricting New Jersey after the Census of 2010, CENTER FOR GOVERNMENT SERVICES, 
RUTGERS UNIVERSITY, 11, March 2008. 
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 Reock, supra note 86, at 12.  
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 Karcher, 462 U.S., at 727.  
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 Id.  
 15 
the commission or body who drew the boundary lines could have done so in a way that could 
eliminate or reduce the population differences.
90
 If the case moves to the second question, the 
state has the burden of showing whether there was a state interest at play and, in effect, justifying 
the reasons why the districts are drawn the way they are.
91
  
In the wake of the unconstitutional map, the temporary Commission was established and 
tasked with redrawing the boundaries with regard to the 1990 Census, in which the number of 
seats assigned to New Jersey was reduced from fourteen to thirteen.
92
 The law that vested 
redistricting power in the temporary commission was set to sunset on January 1, 2001, sending 
the redistricting process back to the Legislature.
93
 Due to the success of the Commission 
redrawing the boundaries after the 1990 Census, however, the New Jersey Constitution was 
amended in 1995 by a referendum vote to permanently establish the commission.
94
  
The redistricting Commission is made up of thirteen members: six democrats, six 
republicans and one independent.
95
 Not only are members’ political affiliation accounted for, but 
due consideration must be given to “geographic, ethnic and racial diversity.”96 Members of the 
redistricting commission are appointed as follows: two members are appointed by the President 
of the New Jersey Senate, two members are appointed by the Speaker of the New Jersey General 
Assembly, two members are appointed by the minority leader in the New Jersey Senate, two 
members are appointed by the minority leader in the New Jersey General Assembly, two 
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91
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92
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members are appointed by the party who holds the governorship, and two members are 
appointed by the chairman of the political party who’s candidate received the second largest 
number of votes at the most recent gubernatorial election.
97
 The thirteenth member is appointed 
by the other twelve to serve as an independent member and chairman of the Commission. The 
individual appointed as the thirteenth member cannot have held an elected public or party office 
in New Jersey during the five years prior to the appointment.
98
 Along with requirements for who 
may be appointed, the New Jersey Constitution also lays out a strict timeline that the 
Commission, as well as those nominating the Commission, must follow.
99
  
When the temporary Commission undertook drawing the lines after the 1990 Census, the 
enabling statute put the Commission under strict guidelines. Under the Districting Standards 
statute, the congressional districts were required to be drawn to “provide for equality of 
population among districts; for the preservation of minority voting status within each district; for 
the geographical contiguity of individual districts; and for reasonable protection for districts from 
decade to decade against disruptive alteration due to redistricting.”100 Additionally, the statutes 
elaborated on protection of minority groups: no Congressional district shall be drawn which 
separates an ethnic or racial minority community, that if left intact, would constitute a majority 
or significant number of voters with the ability to elect the candidate of their choice.
101
 These 
standards have subsequently been omitted from the Constitutional language adopted in 1995.
102
 
Under federal law, however, if districts are not drawn constitutionally and proportionally, the 
entire state Congressional delegation would have to be elected at large.
103
 If New Jersey was 
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100
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required to elect its representatives at-large, that would mean New Jersey delegation would be 
elected by and represent the state at-large, instead of smaller districts. An at-large district would 
negatively affect New Jersey constituents the responsibility of the Representatives will have 
shifted from twelve smaller groups of people, to the state as a whole.  
In compliance with the rules, the current Commission held the first meeting on Tuesday, 
September 6, 2011.
104
 The New Jersey Constitution requires the Commission to complete the re-
drawn map by the latest of either the third Tuesday in the next year or within three months after 
receipt of official notification from the Clerk of the House of Representatives regarding the 
number of House seats apportioned to New Jersey.
105
 Additionally, the Commission must hold at 
least three public hearings in different parts of the State.
106
 It can otherwise work privately. 
Therefore, the Commission needed a completed constitutional map by January 17, 2012. Ahead 
of schedule, Farmer selected the Republican map on December 23, 2011, giving the Grand Old 
Party (“GOP”) the victory in the 2011 redistricting battle.107  
                                                                                                                                                             
“Until a State is redistricted in the manner provided by the law thereof after any apportionment, 
the Representatives to which such State is entitled under such apportionment shall be elected in 
the following manner: (1) If there is no change in the number of Representatives, they shall be 
elected from the districts then prescribed by the law of such State, and if any of them are elected 
from the State at large they shall continue to be so elected; (2) if there is an increase in the number 
of Representatives, such additional Representative or Representatives shall be elected from the 
State at large and the other Representatives from the districts then prescribed by the law of such 
State; (3) if there is a decrease in the number of Representatives but the number of districts in such 
State is equal to such decreased number of Representatives, they shall be elected from the districts 
then prescribed by the law of such State; (4) if there is a decrease in the number of Representatives 
but the number of districts in such State is less than such number of Representatives, the number 
of Representatives by which such number of districts is exceeded shall be elected from the State at 
large and the other Representatives from the districts then prescribed by the law of such State; or 
(5) if there is a decrease in the number of Representatives and the number of districts in such State 
exceeds such decreased number of Representatives, they shall be elected from the State at large.  
104
 The Commission was required to hold its first public meeting no later than Wednesday after the first Monday in 
September 2011. Matt Friedman, Congressional Redistricting Process Starts in N.J. with 15-minute Meeting, 
N.J.COM, Sept. 7, 2011, http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2011/09/congressional_redistricting_pr.html. 
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http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/post/new-jersey-tilts-redistricting-battle-toward- 
gop/2011/12/27/gIQAHmEnKP_blog.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2012).  
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 In 2011, the redistricting Commission drew New Jersey’s thirteen districts into twelve 
due to population shifts across the country. While needing to eliminate a district is difficult in 
itself, the process was made more complex because all of New Jersey’s incumbent House 
members – six Democrats and six Republicans, are actively seeking reelection. 108 
Notwithstanding former Rep. Payne’s successor, New Jersey’s House members will likely 
remain the same, minus one Democrat, thus leaving New Jersey to be equally represented by 
both parties.
109
 In June 2012, Rep. Bill Pascrell defeated Rep. Steve Rothman in the Democratic 
primary for the newly drawn District 9.
110
 The 2011 map dismantled Rep. Steve Rothman’s (D) 
district, District 9, by drawing his hometown of Fair Lawn, New Jersey, into the conservative-
leaning District 5, represented by Rep. Scott Garrett (R).
111
  The majority of Rep. Rothman’s 
district was combined into District 8, represented by fellow Democrat, Rep. Bill Pascrell.
112
 Rep. 
Rothman could have chosen to face-off against Rep. Garrett (R) for Garrett’s redrawn Fifth 
District instead of a primary battle with Rep. Pascrell. However, because the majority of Rep. 
Rothman’s district was combined with Rep. Pascrell’s, Rep. Rothman chose to follow the 
constituents he had represented since 1996.
113
 This decision not only guarantees Rep. Garrett’s 
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reelection to the Fifth District, but also, the Democratic Party will now lose an incumbent 
representative, hurting the party locally as well as nationally.  
Thus, by pitting two Democrats against each other, Rep. Rothman and Rep. Pascrell, both 
of whom have held their respective seats since 1996, the scales are tipped for a GOP victory in 
New Jersey in 2012. While the 2012 election for the United States House of Representatives for 
the New Jersey delegation will most likely end in equal representation of both parties, the 
Democrats being slated to lose one seat from 2010, creates a victory for New Jersey Republicans 
and potentially Republicans nationwide.  While on its face this seems the fairest route, as New 
Jersey will now likely be represented by an equal number of Democrats and Republicans, the 
question that must be addressed is, is this a fair representation of New Jersey?  
III. POLITIAL MACHINES, COMMUNITIES AT RISK AND PROTECTION OF 
INCUMBENT REPRESENTATIVES 
 
A. INCUMBENCY PROTECTION 
Depending on the factors taken into account and the procedures used to redraw the 
boundaries, redistricting outcomes vary. The following are the four most likely outcomes: (1) an 
incumbent may have no change at all and a safe road to reelection; (2) an incumbent may be 
placed in a newly-formed district consisting mostly of voters from the opposite party and have 
slim chances for re-election; (3) two members of the same party could find themselves fighting 
against each other for portions of their previous district now drawn as one; or, (4) more of a 
compromise, a Democrat and Republican incumbent may end up in a district where the winner is 
a toss-up.
114
 In slicing and dicing any state, the ideal situation when undertaking congressional 
redistricting is to eliminate partisan politics and the role of incumbency from the vision of the 
Commission. Instead, the Commission should focus on putting the best interests of voters and 
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constituents at the forefront of the redistricting process by keeping communities together and 
maintaining for equal representation throughout all of the states’ districts, thus creating a fair 
representation of New Jersey in the House of Representatives. 
In practice, by protecting incumbents when redrawing districts, the political contests are 
essentially decided before Election Day.
115
 New Jersey’s approach to redistricting generally 
favors protection of incumbents, instead of keeping communities and people of similar interests 
together.
116
 The effect of protecting incumbents are high rates of reelection, declining 
competitiveness of congressional districts and long periods of one-party control of the House of 
Representatives.
117
 These effects have eroded the accountability and legitimacy of the House of 
Representatives.
118
 In 2011, it is clear that incumbent protection was at the forefront of the 
Commission’s interests: all twelve districts are considered sweetheart districts and eleven of the 
twelve incumbent representatives seeking reelection should see no problem in their 2012 
campaigns.
119
  
Supporters of incumbent protection argue that it “minimizes disruption for voters and 
leads to greater continuity…[and] maintains their seniority in the House of Representatives, 
which is key to obtaining critical committee chairmanships and leadership posts in Congress.”120 
Some states, however, view this protection as illegitimate.
121
 Incumbency protection stifles the 
democratic process by generating lower voter turnout and limiting competition, thus attracting 
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less qualified challengers and ultimately hurting constituents.
122
 The GOP’s 2011 map forced 
two Democrats to run against each other in the June 2012 primary, Rep. Rothman and Rep. 
Pascrell. The newly formed District 9 contains fifty four percent of Rep. Rothman’s previous 
constituents and forty three percent of Rep. Pascrell’s.123 No Republican incumbents face the 
fear of an intra-party primary contest or genuine possibility of being defeated in the 2012 
election. While it is clear that the GOP’s main intention was protecting their own party’s 
incumbents, it is likely that five Democrat incumbents will be reelected in 2012 as well. 
Additionally, District 10 will likely remain safe for the Democratic Party, despite Rep. Donald 
Payne’s March 2012 death.124 While New Jersey has lost a seat for the next Congress and the 
lines have been redrawn, incumbents still come away with the victory. The map shows no signs 
of incumbency defeat in 2012.
125
  
The importance of protecting as many incumbents as possible was recognized as well. 
Due to the fact that New Jersey was guaranteed to lose at least one incumbent in 2012 (and now 
two due to Rep. Payne’s passing), constituents were concerned with preserving the power of the 
New Jersey delegation, as “seniority begets influence.” 126  Continuity of representation is 
important because seniority is necessary to receive the most coveted and powerful committee 
appointments in Congress. This concern was weighed against compactness, however.
127
 While it 
is true that incumbency protection and compactness both allows for more effective representation 
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in Congress, there is a difference in the type of representation. Through seniority, the 
Representative is able to receive more powerful committee appointments and thus bring more 
money and projects back to their districts. Through district compactness, however, the 
Representative’s district will likely be comprised of people with similar interests and economic 
situations and allowing the Representative travel throughout the district with greater ease, 
hearing constituents needs and bringing those concerns back to Congress. While protecting 
incumbents is one of the most important factors in redistricting, it must be balanced with the 
interests of constituents and keeping communities together. As explored in Part B, infra, keeping 
communities of interest intact should be the driving force behind redrawing the lines, as the 
residents of New Jersey are the voices and interests Congressmen are representing in 
Washington, D.C.  
B. COMMUNITIES OF INTEREST 
Community of interest is not defined in New Jersey, the New Jersey State Constitution 
only requires districts to be lawful.
128
 In California and Alabama, however, the redistricting 
commission is equipped with guidelines on what to consider and what not consider when 
redrawing the lines. In California, those tasked with redrawing the lines cannot consider the 
political inclinations of the voters or the incumbents’ residency.129 In Alabama, conversely, it is 
instructed to consider where the incumbents live when redistricting.
130
 The New Jersey 
Redistricting Commission should work to develop standards regarding communities of 
interest.
131
 If standards are developed, the redistricting process will become more transparent and 
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overtime, communities will be better served in Congress. The standards should focus on keeping 
municipalities together, using county lines and highways and interstates as starting points when 
redrawing the lines, and taking natural boundaries, like rivers, into account when redistricting. 
Taking newspaper circulation into account was also an idea voiced at the public meetings.
132
 
Media markets are an important factor, not only for campaigning, but for both the constituent 
and the Representative staying well informed at what interests the communities and what is 
happening in Washington, D.C.   
Linking towns with similar interests should be the driving factor in Congressional 
redistricting.  It is true that many voters may feel disenfranchised in districts where partisanship 
is taken into account and constituents with similar interests, who arguably, will vote the same 
way, will ultimately leave out those constituents on the opposite end of the spectrum. While 
doubts in the legitimacy of the American government should not be disregarded and low voter 
turnout is a major concern, by creating districts with like-minded people, the Representatives 
will be able to respond to their constituencies better.
 133
 Instead of spending the time attempting 
to generate a big tent approach to a heterogeneous district and relate to the district generally, 
Representatives can instead focus on the specific needs of the community because they will 
likely be the same throughout the district.  
As a result of the 2011 map, fifteen municipalities are now split between multiple 
districts.
134
 Montclair, New Jersey, a generally politically active township comprised of a 
                                                 
132
 Id. at 15; see also Oct. 11, 2011 II, supra note 149, at 4-5.  
133
 October 11, 2011 II Minutes, supra note 149, at 3.  
134
 Bayonne, Bloomfield, East Greenwich, Jersey City, Kearny, Middletown, Montclair, Newark, Old Bridge, Point 
Pleasant, Scotch Plains, Stafford, Teaneck, Union, and West Orange are the New Jersey municipalities that have 
been split between multiple districts. Each municipality was split between two districts. See New Jersey 
Redistricting Commission, Adopted Map, Detailed Maps of Multi-District Municipalities, available at 
http://www.njredistrictingcommission.org/adoption.asp (last visited Mar. 9. 2012).  
 24 
population 37,669,
135
 is a useful case study. Montclair has generally always been divided into 
two districts, with the northern portion of the town being represented by Rep. Pascrell (D-8) and 
the southern portion by the late Rep. Donald Payne (D-10).
136
 While it is still unclear from the 
adopted map exactly where the new boundaries will lie, much of Montclair has been drawn in 
the GOP territory of Rep. Rodney Frelinghuyen’s (R) District 11.137 Montclair’s residents are 
made up of 14,711 registered Democrats, 2,541 registered Republicans, and 9,900 voters not 
affiliated with a political party.
138
 The redrawn Eleventh District now includes 11,299 Montclair 
residents, however, at the time of publication, numbers on the political party have not been 
released yet. While the roughly 2,500 registered Republicans Montclair residents and whatever 
faction of the 9,9000 independent voters who lean right, if lucky enough to live within the 
redrawn Eleventh District, are, arguably, being represented for the first time in decades, the 
community as a whole suffers.  Rep. Pascrell has represented District 8 since 1996 and the late 
Rep. Payne has represented District 11 since 1989.  For the first time in decades, Montclair will 
have two new representatives after the 2012 election. Six Democrats have filed to replace the late 
Rep. Payne, including his son, Donald Jr., Newark Council President.
139
 While Montclair already 
has less input as a town because it straddles two districts instead of being kept together as a 
politically active, cohesive unit, it is further diluted by being represented by an incumbent who is 
not familiar with Montclair and their needs and interests. While it is unclear at this time who will 
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be filling the seat vacated by the late Rep. Payne, the new Representative could help ease the 
concerns of Montclair citizens that their representation and interests will be lost between the 
redrawn lines.  
 Additionally, East Greenwich, New Jersey and Point Pleasant, New Jersey, the two 
municipalities with the smallest populations that are straddling two districts, have a population of 
9,555 and 18,392, respectively.
140
 While it is clear that the Commission held true to the maxim 
one person, one vote, as ten of the newly redrawn districts in New Jersey have a total population 
of 732,658 and the remaining two newly redrawn districts have a population of 732,657, splitting 
up communities should not be seen as a worthy sacrifice. Additionally, District 3 cuts across the 
entire state, from the New Jersey shore to the Pennsylvania border.
141
 When a district spreads 
across the entire state, Representatives may not only have issues relating to their constituents and 
serving the varying needs of those living across the entire state of New Jersey, the representative 
will also have trouble visiting and traveling throughout the district. This was a concern addressed 
by residents of New Jersey at the first public hearing hosted in South Jersey.
142
 Keeping the 
districts compact will eliminate the problems that come with drawing a district like District 13. 
Communities encompass people with common interests, and, especially small towns as a 
whole are more likely to have people of similar backgrounds, with similar interests and goals, 
and similar economic situations. Therefore, cutting a municipality in half, drawing one corner of 
a city or town, or in Point Pleasant’s situation, a few streets, into a different district, the areas 
siphoned off, and the municipality as a whole, suffer. It creates confusion as to who their 
representative is and low voter turnout, as people are less likely to know where to go to vote or 
who they are actually voting for, which ultimately leads to a community of less politically active 
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constituents. If constituents do not know whom to contact regarding upcoming votes, projects 
within the community, or national issues, the community is the one that suffers. If constituents 
do not know which member of the United State House of Representatives represents the section 
of the city or town they live in, he or she is not held accountable for the state of things in the 
community, good or bad, creating less incentive for visiting the municipality, hearing the issues 
that concern the citizens of the municipality, or furthering their interests in Washington, D.C. 
Most incumbents, regardless of whether or not they are known in their districts, are almost 
certain to not face a primary challenger from his or her own party and to be reelected to the 
United States House of Representatives. While incumbency status and seniority status serve 
important interests in Washington, D.C., the redistricting process is being used to protect the 
political machines already in place. By creating a commission of political insiders, communities 
will be scarified in order to serve the best interests of the political machine.   
Communication with the Congressman also suffers due to area code differences and 
Franked mail.
143
 Point Pleasant and Brick Township, while, adjacent communities, have different 
area codes. The few streets in Point Pleasant that are broken off into District 3, grouped with 
Brick Township, will receive constituent mail from Rep. Chris Smith (R-4), the current 
incumbent and likely winner of the 2012 election for District 4, and not from their current 
Representative. While the interests of Point Pleasant and Brick Township will likely be very 
similar, breaking down a small community of roughly 18,000 citizens, 16,590 residents are 
placed within the newly redrawn District 4, and 1,802 will be placed in the newly redrawn 
District 3. Similarly, in East Greenwich, 7,747 residents have been placed in the newly redrawn 
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District 1 and 1,808 will be placed in the newly redrawn District 2.  In Scotch Plains, 22,419 
residents are placed within the redrawn District 12 and 1,091 are placed within the redrawn 
District 7.
144
 The same issues regarding receiving Franked mail from Representatives that affect 
the residents of Point Pleasant placed in District 3 will affect fourteen other municipalities that 
straddle two districts.  This can indirectly lead to a disenfranchised district, which is a district 
where a person’s vote is rendered ineffective.145 By creating twelve districts that, from a political 
party standpoint, are virtually noncompetitive, and by breaking up fifteen municipalities, voters 
will feel less incentive to vote and thus remove themselves further from the political process.   
 The 2011 map, however, is a welcome improvement from the map drawn after the 2000 
Census. After the 2000 Census and redistricting process, New Jersey’s congressional districts 
split twenty-nine of the state’s municipalities, two of which (Linden and Jersey City) were split 
among three congressional districts.
146
 The 2011 map reduces this number to fifteen, almost half, 
and only splits municipalities into two districts, instead of the previous three.  Generally, the 
community will be better off as a majority in one district, without regard to which political party 
wins the district, than being divided between two or more districts. Going forward, the 
Commission should continue in its efforts to keep municipalities and communities of similar 
interests together.  
Keeping communities contained within a single district was not the only concern voiced 
at the public meetings. South Jersey was also very concerned with one person, one vote and 
equal representation.
147
 Protecting a community identity, however, was of utmost importance to 
those in attendance at the public meetings. Calling it “home rule,” the Mayor of Gloucester 
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Township cited confusion when neighborhoods are divided and pride in the community as 
reasons to keep municipalities together.
148
 The shared services between neighboring 
municipalities was also cited as a reason to keep communities of similar interests together.
149
 
Additional concerns and factors asserted at the meetings were proposing to take into account 
New Jersey’s diverse communities by keeping diverse populations with a clearly shard 
community together in order to allow the community to speak as one.
150
 The public meeting that 
took place in Newark, New Jersey, focused mainly on the idea of keeping the Voting Rights Act 
at the center of the process. From keeping the Muslim-American communities in Passaic County 
together
151
 to working against the dilution of the Asian American vote throughout New Jersey.
152
 
Each district is made up of more than 730,000 constituents; therefore, not everyone in the 
district is going to have similar interests. Even the largest cities in New Jersey, which have 
populations less than 300,000 people, are not comprised of residents with similar backgrounds, 
similar interest, and similar values.  However, by drawing the districts in a way to keep the areas 
with like-minded people together, even if it is made of multiple groups of like-minded people, 
representatives will be able to serve their constituents better. In creating clearly defined 
communities of interest, representatives will be better able to hone in on what is important to the 
various communities of interest in their district. The idea isn’t to make districts heterogeneous, 
but to make it easier and clearly define what the constituents want, thus facilitating better 
communication and representative in Washington D.C.  
C. PARTISAN POLITICS 
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 While New Jersey seems to have eliminated some of the partisan politics from the 
redistricting process by appointing an independent, bipartisan Commission to re-draw the lines, it 
cannot escape partisan politics entirely. As directed by the New Jersey Constitution, six members 
are appointed by the majority party in the state legislature and governorship and six members are 
appointed by the minority party in the state legislature, with only one appointment dubbed 
actually “independent”.153 Theoretically, because the commission is comprised of six members 
of the Republican Party and six members of the Democratic Party, as well as a “compromise” 
member, the Commission is independent of the state legislature and relatively neutral.
154
 In 
practice, however, there seems to be no such thing as purely neutral redistricting, as one side 
always stands to gain from the way the map is drawn.
155
  
Other states that vest the power of redistricting in an independent commission are 
Arizona,
156
 Idaho,
157
 Washington,
158
 and Hawaii,
159
 as well as others. While taking the process of 
legislative redistricting out of the hands of the legislature and into an independent commission 
was an important first step in removing partisan politics from this arena, politics is still front and 
center in redistricting. Due in large part to an unspoken agreement between both major political 
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parties to draw district boundaries into “sweetheart districts” to create safe districts for 
incumbents, or “sweethearts,”160 the major political parties are benefited, but sometimes at the 
expense of the communities.
161
 When cities, towns and communities are split apart for the 
benefit of incumbent protection, the voters are the ones who suffer. While it is true that 
committees are the lifeblood of Congress and that seniority is the perquisite to getting things 
done in Congress, if a town is split into multiple districts, then constituents will be even more 
confused as to where they are supposed to go.  
After the 2000 Census, the districts in New Jersey were drawn with almost precisely 
equal populations.
162
 In order to do that, twenty-nine municipalities were split between two or 
more Congressional districts.
163
 While equal population of districts is of constitutional 
importance and mandated by “one person, one vote” the importance of keeping communities 
together and drawing the lines in accordance with town boundaries or county lines would serve 
the constituents, often seen as the bosses of their representatives, better.  
 While supporters of incumbency protection will argue that it promotes stability,
164
 that 
argument, however, is hollow because the Framers designed the national legislature in a way that 
eliminates this concern. In creating the Senate, the Framers kept in mind this concern, resulting 
in the different qualifications necessary to hold the office, the longer terms, and staggered 
reelections.
165
 In fact, “one of the objectives of the Senate was to tame ‘the propensity of all 
single and numerous assemblies to yield to ... sudden and violent passions’ and provide stability 
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in the face of ‘rapid succession of new members, however qualified they may be.’” 166 
Additionally, because of the high retention rate of incumbents as a general matter, efforts to draw 
the districts in a way to protect their status are often useless. Since 1964, reelection of 
incumbents in the House of Representatives has never dropped below eighty percent.
167
   
 Nationwide, the 2010 round of redistricting “was the most incumbent-friendly in modern 
American history” that not only “insulated incumbents from competition” but also “froze into 
place” what one theorist sees as a “distributional bias” giving Republicans a 50-seat head-start in 
the battle to keep control of Congress.
168
 The normal pattern of elections after the most recent 
round of redistricting generate substantial freshman classes, due to the fact that more incumbents 
retire from the House in post-reapportionment election cycles, more are defeated in primaries, 
more lose in the November general elections and fewer win landslide reelections.
169
 But in 2002, 
the first election after the 2000 round of reapportionment, this pattern did not prove true.
170
 
Instead, the freshman class was decreased by half that of the 1992 election (the election in the 
immediate aftermath of the 1990 round of redistricting), the number of incumbents who retired 
from the House was lower than average and the number of incumbents who won narrowly was 
also half that of the previous post-reapportionment cycle.
171
 What the 1992 numbers do not 
reflect, however, is that the percentage of incumbents who lost reelection was low – a mere 
seven percent.
172
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 As one argument suggests, the key feature of an unbiased redistricting plan is that the 
political party whose candidates attract the most popular votes is rewarded with the most seats in 
the legislature, treating the two majors parties on equal footing and not, either impliedly or 
explicitly, giving preference to which ever party is currently in control.
173
  Moreover, while 
putting aside what party stands to benefit would be a welcome move in the right direction, 
ignoring the individual who represents each districts, regardless of political party, and keeping 
the interests of the voters in mind, should be the ultimate goal of the New Jersey Redistricting 
Commission. Keeping communities together breeds more active participation in politics. As the 
saying goes, all politics are local politics. Therefore in order to find out what best suits the needs 
of communities, whether it be numerous small towns lumped together through proximity and 
common interests (like the New Jersey coast area, for example), or large cities who’s citizens get 
lost in the shuffle of the bureaucracy, they need to be kept together. The best way to find out the 
interests and needs of people is on the grassroots level. The representatives in Congress will be 
more responsive to the needs of communities if communities are first kept together, then given 
an incentive to band together to better focus and target their needs from Washington. When 
communities are torn apart in an effort to protect a seat for the Republican or Democratic parties, 
the voters suffer.   
The members making up the Commission are no strangers to New Jersey politics. Of the 
Republican delegation, there are current and past freeholders, past town council members, a 
former Justice Department official, and a current assemblywoman.
174
 Of the Democratic 
delegation, a former member of the New Jersey General Assembly who also served on the 
legislative redistricting process, a current assemblywoman who serves as the Vice Chair of the 
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Democratic delegation for the New Jersey Legislative Apportionment Commission, a former 
Chief of Staff for Rep. Pascrell, former New Jersey Governor John Corzine’s Deputy Chief of 
Staff, a former freeholder and city council member.
175
 By creating an independent commission 
that is full of political insiders, the commission does not really act independently at all. Instead of 
creating a commission filled with people who have never worked in politics, but instead are 
professors at local colleges, statisticians, or the like, instead of those immersed in politics, the 
commission could better serve the constituents.  
 When those tasked with the job of redrawing the lines do so in way that protects 
incumbents, the drafters go against what the Framers envisioned when creating the House of 
Representatives. The House, as James Madison saw it, was intended to be the body of the people 
and should “be in miniature an exact portrait of the people at large. It should think, feel, reason, 
and act like them.”176 If the New Jersey Redistricting Commission puts the interests of the 
incumbency first, then they are in fact defeating the intentions for the body. “Redistricting has 
helped to transform the U.S. House of Representatives into a body that will no longer accurately 
reflect majority will.”177 
IV. SHOULD COMPUTERS DRAW THE LINES? 
 Computers have been cast as both the potential heroes and the potential villain in the 
ongoing battle of the best way to approach redistricting nationwide.
178
 Using computers to 
redistrict is not a novel idea – the Supreme Court has considered the issue since the 1960s. In 
1969, Justice Harlan opined, “[a] computer may grind out district lines which can totally frustrate 
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the popular will on an overwhelming number of critical issues.”179 In 2004, the Court in Vieth v. 
Jubelirer, amplified this view stating, “the availability of enhanced computer technology allows 
the parties to redraw boundaries in ways that target individual neighborhoods and homes, carving 
out safe but slim victory margins in the maximum number of districts, with little risk of cutting 
their margins too thin.”180   
 As with every apparent solution, there are pitfalls. Two strong objections to automated 
redistricting are: (1) it is not inherently objective and (2) political bias is unavoidable because it 
is up to legislators to select among the automation plans available.
181
 As former President Ronald 
Reagan put it, “[t]here is only one way to do reapportionment – feed into the computer all the 
factors except political registration.” 182  However, by feeding the numbers into a computer 
system, the automation of the program masks the political conflict.
183
 Additionally, former 
President Reagan’s view could be seen as short sighted today. With the diversity of the United 
States, and especially New Jersey, increasing daily, political registration could be an important 
factor to consider when drawing the boundaries. As argued above, by keeping communities with 
similar interests together, Representatives will be better equipped with specific ways to benefit 
their constituencies in Washington, D.C.
184
  
 Moreover, savvy computer programmers can calibrate their system to protect the interests 
of one of the major political parties often defeat the neutrality of the process. The lines can still 
be drawn to “maximize precisely their party’s representation and minimize the other’s.” resulting 
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in “sham …elections” with more polarizing and less competitive seats.185 Some research has 
shown that “computers have enabled authorities to create redistricting plans more quickly and 
cheaply, but have not substantially affected plans’ content.” 186 Polarization and neutral 
redistricting procedures was also voiced during the public hearings.  Nolan McCarty, a Professor 
of Politics and Public Affairs, and Chair of the Politics Department at Princeton University, 
argued that there is very little link between polarization and the process by which the lines are 
redrawn.
187
 He argued that by striving to create heterogeneous districts, competitive districts the 
Commission would be doing the opposite of what American’s want. 188  According to Mr. 
McCarty, the Commission should not overly emphasize creating electorally competitive districts 
for the sake of reducing partisanship and polarization, and to strive to create districts that reflect 
the partisanship of the state.
189
  
CONCLUSION  
 Congressional redistricting is flawed not only in New Jersey, but also across the country. 
The question remains if the issue will ever be solved? It is inherent in human nature to protect 
personal interests first and it seems unclear at this point if there will ever be a way to totally ever 
remove partisan politics from redistricting.  In 2012, political interests and incumbency 
protection were of utmost concern for the members of the New Jersey Redistricting Commission, 
with electoral competitiveness and the interest of political outsides being pushed aside. In an 
effort to make the process fairer to constituents, the Commission should continue its attempt to 
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respect communities of similar interests by keeping them intact in compact districts as well as 
foster greater competition by focusing less on incumbency protection and more on town and 
county lines of where the interests fall. Instead of using the lines as a means of strategy to keep 
the political elite in office, when the Commission is given the opportunity to reevaluate New 
Jersey every ten years, it should use that time to make changes that benefit the constituents of 
New Jersey, and not just those heading to Washington, D.C.  
 
